British propaganda: Its impact on America in World War I by Banks, Robert V
University of Nebraska at Omaha
DigitalCommons@UNO
Student Work
8-1-1969
British propaganda: Its impact on America in
World War I
Robert V. Banks
University of Nebraska at Omaha
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/studentwork
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by
DigitalCommons@UNO. It has been accepted for inclusion in Student
Work by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UNO. For
more information, please contact unodigitalcommons@unomaha.edu.
Recommended Citation
Banks, Robert V., "British propaganda: Its impact on America in World War I" (1969). Student Work. 365.
https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/studentwork/365
g/t,
EHITISa PROPASAITOAt EPS IMPACT ON 
AMERICA IN WORID MAS I
A Thesis 55 6 
Presented to the 
Department of History 
and the
Faculty of the Graduate College 
University of Nebraska at Omaha
Tti partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Master of Arts
by
Robert V. Banks 
August 1968
UMI Number: EP73003
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Published by ProQuest LLC (2015). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI EP73003
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
Accepted for the faculty of the Graduate College of the University
of Nebraska at Omaha# in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree Master of Arts*
%
Department
Graduate Committee ,
// f] A (?) /J^J—  Vepartmmt
.
U)t
Representative of Graduate oil
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
I. INTRODUCTION..........    1
II. DEVELOPMENT OF BRITISH PROPAGANDA.......  3
III. LONDON'S PERSUASION IN AMERICA  ......  11
IV. BERLIN'S PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN ...........  20
V. THE AMERICAN REACTION.........    27
VI. THE CASE AGAINST BRITISH PROPAGANDA.. 39
VII. DECISION FOR WAR....       55
VIII. CONCLUSION ..........................  71
XIKTRODUCTIOK
Psychological warfare, with propaganda as one of its principal 
instrument, emerged in World War I as a lethal force which in some 
ways was comparable to technological advances in weaponry^  Just as 
aerial bombing, deadly gases and modem arms marked a new era in whole­
sale killing, so propaganda was a milestone in the battle of warring 
nations to control public opinion. The war did not usher in propaganda; 
its roots have been traced back to the Crusades and beyond. It was the 
"Great War," however, that produced the beginnings of today's sophis­
ticated propaganda techniques. So effective, in fact, was World War I 
propaganda that some scholars hold it chiefly responsible for America's 
decision to take up arms against Germany.
These scholars base their proposition on the premise that the 
nation's nineteenth century hands-off diplomacy toward Europe, had it 
not been influenced by British propaganda, could have preserved 
American neutrality. They contend that the war was a typical European 
power struggle in which the United States had no stake. Their thesis 
further maintains that German-American grievances could have been 
resolved peacefully had Wilsonian neutrality been applied in equal 
measure to all belligerents* To the contrary, their proposition 
advances the argument that American diplomacy with Germany was, in 
effect, a hostile neutrality. They assert that Washington assumed an 
on-guard stance against Berlin —  the speedy dispatch of ultimatums at 
the slightest provocation, a philosophy of suspicion and mistrust, the 
threat of severing diplomatic ties. In all of this is detected the
athread of British propaganda, stirring up aati*-German feeling in the 
Baited States* Pushed on by London-generated publicity, according to 
the argument, the United States in 191? had played out all the options 
which might have averted war with Germany. She blame reposed at the 
doorstep of British propaganda*
0?he problems in assessing the validity of this proposition in­
clude a survey of the development of British propaganda and a study*
Of the scope of London persuasion in the United States* Sbese 
findings must he weighed against the German program in order to contrast 
the extent of belligerent publicity activities. F^inally, the American 
reaction, the charges against'British propaganda and the issues in­
volved in America’s decision to tafce up anas can be assessed in trying 
to determine whether England induced the nation to go to war*
CHAPTER IX
€F BM8SI PiDPMAiBA
1b© Of M m  Minister 1# i« Asguitb began- moving at
the outset of World War I to erg&aito a propaganda campaign, which
wouM project a favorable British image at tote and abroad* Charles
Jtoternaa wan appointed in September# 191 #^ to organise and direct a
Propaganda Bureau* Btausterisaa# who hfift "bees a Member o f P arliam asit
and financial Secretary to the Ikeasury* was Chancellor of the Buchy
of Lancaster Cbairtaan of the Rational Health Insurance Joint
Committee at the tim of his appointment* Hie offices of the Xasur-
isae© Cmittee- were located .la. a building in London called Wellington
1louse# and it was there that Mastorman set up the Propaganda Bureau* -
the Government disclosed tm facts stout the new organisation* Ashed
In Parliament to describe Mastermaa/s activities# the Prime Minister
refused to discuss the setter* **fh© work is of a highly confidential
Ustnrai” Asquith said# ftsnd of its 'efficiency upon its-
.,2
being conducted in secret* On another occasion a QommoKfc spokes- 
man, Sir A* b. Markham# told Parliament that Mastoiman’s group was 
stored with providing the Govemaent with information respecting all
1
jraaee B . S q u ire s , Br lt le h  g fig s a e s te  g t g a g . 2S&. M  f e .  S M M
States team I^lb to 1^7, lCh«toPlAa»# Mass.* Harvard Bntvemity Press# 
3505)”  P- 26.
a
, 2S&. teUsgg&asg Berates, Ssaspife* S’1*01 Series, V*!.
To# House of Catenas (Londons Bis Majesty* 0 Stationery Office# 1915) # 
ads*- 704-T05*
k».3report© that appear la foreign papers/ Masterman said the Wellington
House staff produced and distributed books, pamphlets, speeches and
Government publications dealing with the war* The Propaganda Bureau
assisted Government officials in placing articles and interviews in
foreign newspapers* In this same vein, the organization helped
London-based correspondents of neutral newspapers, especially American,
kobtain information and interviews.
While the Wellington louse staff was the Government ’ s principal
propaganda agency, other departments also operated miniature publicity
units* lord Beaverbrook, the last war-time head of British propaganda,
wrote that the service ministries were adamant about operating lade­
'spendent agencies. In December, 1916, when David Lloyd George suc­
ceeded Asquith as Prime Minister, the Government began forcing the 
ministries to integrate their propaganda programs* This was attributed 
in part to the personality of Lloyd George end his determination to 
strengthen the system. He was credited with perhaps being the first
6British politician to use to full advantage the press and public opinion*
3lbia., eel. 587
h
'Lord Beavefbrook, Men and Power. 1917*1918 (Loudens Hutchinson & 
Company, 1956), p* 27T*
5
Ibid*
Rodney 0* Davis, Power, Public Opinion, and Diplomacy (Durham,
$* 0*; Duke University Press, 1959), pp* 226*22?*
5He established a Department of Information and appointed Colonel John
Buchan, who had done extensive work in the Foreign Office's propaganda
program, to head it. The Department of Information was divided into
four sections* Masterman's Wellington House staff continued to
produce books and pamphlets. A political intelligence department was
charged with assessing and analysing world public opinion as it was
reflected in the foreign press* The news department prepared stories
end arranged interviews for London-based foreign correspondents* The
fourth section was a cinema department* Buchan was directly respon-
7Bible to the. 'Prime Minister*
Still dissatisfied, Lloyd George appointed an advisory committee
to assist Buchan* The committee included two eminent publisher©, Lord
Horfchcllffe and Lord Beavefbrook* Even this move failed to produce the
harmony which the Prime Minister sought* He then placed a member of
8the War Cabinet, Sir Edward Carson, in charge of the program. Leader 
of the Irish Unionists and Member of Parliament for Dublin University, 
Carson had served from May to October, 1915, as Attorney-General in the 
Asquith Cabinet* Resigning in the dissension which preceded Asquith's 
downfall, Carson returned to prominence when Lloyd George appointed him 
First Lord of the Admiralty. His service in that post was marked by 
bickering so intense that he was removed in July, 1917, and appointed to
The Parliamentary Debates. Official Report. Fifth Series, Vol. 
109, iLondon: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1918),
cols, 91*9-950.
8
■Squires, op* eit*. pp. 35-36.
6the War Cabinet as Minister without portfolio* He was placed in
of all propaganda activity in September*^ Buchan continued to
head the Department of information* Carson was characterised m  having
10had .little interest in propaganda* He resigned from, the War Cabinet
in January^  1918. His Importance to the Department of Information did
not stem from personal achievement* rather, the significance was in the
stature of the man himself* His appointment demonstrated the high
priority which lloyd George attached to propaganda in naming a Minister
of the War Cabinet to head the program.
Despite the discord, the propaganda program apparently satisfied
the War Cabinet * The cabinet ’s report for 1917 noted that propaganda
and publicity efforts abroad were being steadily expanded, * * the
11outcome of which can be gauged by the result of the war itself."
There remained one last move to complete the streamlining the 
appointment of a Minister of Information. For this new post DXoyd 
George selected lord Beaverbrook# publisher of The Times* and already 
active in propaganda* A native of Newcastle, Hew Brunswick# Canada, 
Beaverbrook had received his first experience in war propaganda- as 
head of the Canadian program* In announcing his choice to head the new 
ministry# the Frime Minister praised Beaverbrook’ s Canadian publicity
Ian Colvin# The life of lord Carson (Hew fork* The Macmillan 
Company, 1937), Vol* 3# pp*l?rr*278.
10
Beaverbrook, op. ctt.* p. 268
11
War Cabinet Report for the Year 1917 (Dondout His Majesty’s 
Stationery Office# 1918), p# 12.
as having been 15 * » * among the most successful, perhaps the most
12successful, piece of work of its Mud on the Allied side." fhe 
appointment was effective February 10, 1918* Of his assignment, 
Beaverbrook wrote that the public clamored for a ministry which would 
convince the Allies, the dominions and the .neutrals of Britain*© 
capacity to win the war.1^  He noted that he had no blueprint from 
which to build a propaganda organisation to meet these demands j there 
was, he wrote, u. * * nothing but a decision of the War Cabinet de­
creeing that such a ministry should be formed and that I should be the 
minister."1
Given that decree and the War Cabinet’s support, Beaverbrook 
assembled a Ministry of Information which was corporate-like in struc­
ture# the revamped organisation included liord Northeliffe as director 
Of propaganda for enemy countries, lord Rothermere, another publisher, 
m s  head of the program for neutral countries. Author Rudyard Kipling 
was chief of the section for home and colonial publicity. It has been 
questioned whether Beaverbrook actually was Horthcliffe's superior in 
the propaganda organization. Because both men had direct access to 
the Prime Minister, there was speculation they might have had equal
12
Beaverbrook, op. cit., p. 26?.
arank. 7 Such a prospect -was unlikely^  certainly Beaverbrook1 s
writings did not leave tbat impression# Whatever the divisions of
authority, the two m n  and their colleagues helped produce propaganda
sufficiently effective to be denounced by Germany* a General Erich
Lu&en&orff after the war* "We were hypnotised by the enemy propaganda,”
l6he wrote, "as a rabbit is by a snake*"
throughout the war the Govenment*s publicity efforts were aided by 
numerous private, groups. Among these were faculty members at Oxford 
University, who wrote the "Oxford Pamphlets" j the Parliamentary Re­
cruiting Committee, the Cobden Club, a nameless group of Anglican 
clerics, the Loyal Council of British, Austrian and Hungarian Birth, 
the Baited Workers, the Atlantic Union, the Victoria League, the Union
of Democratic Control and the Central Committee for National Patriotic 
17Organizations* 23ais last group, which offers a good example of 
volunteer programs, was organized in November, 191^ * The Central 
Committee soon had local chapters in England and affiliated societies 
throughout the Empire and in neutral countries* British Chambers of 
Commerce were used as centers for distribution of propaganda literature* 
fhe Central Committee assembled a roster of 250 speakers who, by I916,
15
Harold D. lasswell, Bmmmnha technique in the World War 
(New Yorks Alfred A. Knopf, 1927), p. 20.
16
Erich Ludendorff, Jjy War Memories (London: Hutchinson &
Cosrpany, 1919), Vol. 1, p. 30I*
IT
H* C* Peterson, Prooa^nda for War {Noman, Okla.: university 
Of Oklahoma Press, I939), pp* lS*l9*
9bad conducted 15,000 meetings* 850,000 leaflets bad been distributed 
to students end 900,000 in industrial districts* Additionally, 250,000 
pamphlets, boohs and other publications had been sent to neutral 
nations*^
Besides its publicity agencies, Britain possessed another instru­
ment which had a significant part in propaganda* the system of 
censorship, imposed at the outset of the war under the Defense of the 
Eeaba Act, established a Frees Bureau to sit as watchdog on the release 
Of information which might imperil national security* The Act forbade 
the communication of news concerning military operations, troop move­
ment and war production* Designed to provide censorship controls on the
heme front, the measure also became a guideline in propaganda opera- 
19tions. A strong weapon in censorship was British control of the 
cables. In fact, England’s cutting of the cables which linked the
United States and Germany was called the first act Of propaganda in the
20war . The cables were cut on August 5, 191c-.
This was only the start of a massive campaign which Britain waged 
to influence world opinion* It was an effort often hampered by discord 
among governmental offices, each perhaps regarding the others with
18
Ibid.. pp. 19-20
19
Sir Edward Cooke, The Frees in War-Time (bondon* The Macmillan 
Company, 1920), p. 88*
20
Peterson, op. cit*. p* 12.
bureaucratic suspicion* Beginning with the Wellington Bouse staff, 
the publicity organisations sprouted in hither-and-yon fashion until 
lloyd George appointed Beaverbrook to the new Cabinet post of Minister 
Of Infonnation* The publisher of The Times consolidated and centralised 
the operation* But, this retrenching did not begin until February,
1918, long after the British had fired many of their major propaganda 
Shots* Beaverbrook, for instance, was not at the command post during 
the heavy publicity barrage aimed at the United States prior to the 
American declaration of war against Germany on April 6, 1917* It was 
into this campaign that Britain poured much of her propaganda re­
sources and talent*
CHAPTER XIX
m m m ' B  m  m m a h
One of the few phases of British propaganda to survive the 
frequent realignments was the program for the United States* Sir 
Gilbert Barker, a novelist and native of Canada, was placed in charge ' 
of publicity for America at the outset of the war, he served in that 
post until January, 1917# when poor health forced him to resign. He 
had traveled extensively in the United States, where his books had 
been widely read. Settling in England, Barker became a Member of 
Parliament in 1900. He was knighted in 1902, mad© a baronet in June, 
1915, and a member of the Privy Council in June, 1916.1 Although 
technically under Masterman’s supervision, Parker was given falr3y free 
rein. He- commenced with a Mm-mes&er staff in 191^ 1 this had. in-
p
creased to fifty-four by 1917* The specifics of his campaign were 
relatively- simple. Using a Who1© Who in America* he compiled lists of 
prominent citizens to whom propaganda literature was sent. For mailing 
purposes, he made separate growings of people according to their
p
profession, supposed intelligence and social standing in the community.
These Americans received pamphlets, articles and other materials 
Which, it was thought, would be of special interest for business or
1
Squires, gfc* cit., p. 50.
2
Peterson, gg. cit.* p. 23*
12
professional reasons. Parker also maintained personal correspondence 
with influential Americans. This group included such figures as 
university and college presidents, professors, scientists, publishers 
and industrialists. He prevailed upon numerous distinguished English­
men-, to write articles for American newspapers. In the same vein, he 
arranged for London-based correspondents from the United States to 
interview high British Government officials. To reach rural areas in 
the United States, Parker provided 360 small American newspapers with 
an English weekly newspaper which published reviews and comments on 
the war. Literature was distributed to public libraries, Young Men’s 
Christian Association groups, colleges and civic clubs. Besides this 
vast outpouring of publicity, Parker also sent representatives to the 
United States to discuss the war from the British viewpoint. He 
relied upon Masterman’s staff for films, photographs, cartoons, 
drawings and diagrams. It was through films, Parker said, that Britain
k
reached America’s ”... man in the street . . . ."
The tenor of this appeal to the United States was analyzed after 
the war by Harold Lasswell, one of the early students of propaganda.
He concluded that the London attempt at persuasion emerged as a hate- 
Germany campaign. Anglo publicists portrayed Berlin autocracy as 
satanic, violating all moral standards. Britain, on the other hand, 
was projected as the defender of the democratic ideals upon which
h
Sir Gilbert Parker, "The United States and the War," Harper1s 
Monthly Magazine, Vol. CXXXVI, March, 1918, pp. 1526-530*
<5
£»er!ca m  founded. Another student of propaganda, the date H* C.
Bet&r&m of the University of Oklahoma, placed Parker's plea ip the
context of patriotism For an. American to he pro-British was patriotic)
to he pro-German Bordered on treason* "In other words," Peterson wrote,
"the British captured the American flag and waved it in front of them- 
6selves." Atrocity propaganda was the principal tool in London's play
on American emotions. Stories about acts of German savagery ranged
from reports of brutality in Belgium to the sinking of the Lusitania.
One of the most devastating documents was the Bryce Retort.
officially known as the Report of §|a Committee On Alleged German Out-
rages. Lord dames Bryce, who- had been England's ambassador to the
Whited -States and m s  a scholar of American history, headed, a Cabinet-
appointed committee which investigated alleged German savageries in
Belgium, $h© committee’s findings were released on Hay 12, 1915) this
■was only five days after the Lusitania went down, providing. England with
a double-barrelled atrocity blast* For some year© after the war, Britain
m s  accused of releasing the report amid the uproar over the sinking in
order to reap maximum, publicity. Later, some of the harshest critics of
London propaganda in the war —  among wi 10m was Walter MilXis, an American
v
scholar of neutrality —  decided the timing was a coincidence. Ihe
Las-swell, c&. cit., pp. 95-96.
6
Peterson, Q&. cit.. p. 35.
T
Walter Millis, Hoad to War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 
1935)* P. 132.
lU
Bryce Committee charged the German militarists with the wholesale killing
of civilians ". . . to an extent for which no previous war between
8/""
nations claiming to be civilized . * . furnishes any precedent.” ( The ^L 
report related stories of murder, rape, pillage and burning^) Authenti­
city of these stories was widely disputed; Frederick Palmer, an American
war correspondent, said the report itself was one of the war’s worst 
9
atrocities. Allegations about falsehoods and distortions stemmed from
the fact that the committee did not make an inspection of Belgium; nor
did Lord Bryce and his colleagues take the depositions from Belgian
refugees in England. Ihis testimony, which formed the heart of the
10
report, was taken by twenty barristers. Doubt was cast upon the 
integrity of the witnesses, who were not under oath. One American 
journalist reported meeting people in Belgium who implored him ” ... to 
tell the English not to judge us by certain types of our refugees.”
In another instance an English magistrate referred to the refugees as 
"scum."11
Ranking alongside the Biyce Report in terms of propaganda appeal 
was the sinking of the Lusitania, an English liner which was torpedoed by
8
Report of the Committee on Alleged German Outrages (Londons 
Macmillan and Company, Ltd. 1915)> p. 40.
9
Peterson, op. cit., p. 59*
10
James Morgan Read, Atrocity Propaganda (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 19^ 1), P* 203.
11
Ibid.
15
& German tl-bo&t* Justifiability of the sinking ha© been argued over the 
years. Berlin contended that the vessel was no ordinary i r^chantman, 
hut rather an amed boat under orders to use its superior speed to elude 
submarines * On balance* the evidence in post-war investigations tended
i p
to indicate the famitftfiia. ms  not arsed. The liner carried 4,200 cases 
of cartridges containing ten or eleven tons of powder; cargo also in* 
eluded 1,250 case# of shrapnel, the sinking claimed 1,198 lives; of 
these, 128 were Americana, many of them prominent and wealthy. Kurt 
Hahn,’ a German scholar who was lecturing on the British press during the 
war, termed the sinking the great turning point in the collective English 
attitude toward Germany. nTbe empty slogan of the English inflammatory 
press about *Fri^tfulness1 is filled all at once with flesh and blood 
through the children that are washed up on the English coast,"y he 
w r o t e ^  what was termed a propaganda masterpiece, the British 
ordered large-scale reproduction and distribution of a privately**issue&
Geamaa medal celebrating the disaster* Berlin denied that such a medal
, 14 was struck.
It was amid the furor over the Bryce Report and the husitaaia that 
the Germans executed Edith Cavell, the British nurse. Serving in Brussels, 
she was -arrested on August 5, 1915# and charged with having helped English
12
Ibid* * P* 200*
13
Ibid.
14
Squires, op* cit.* p* 33.
end soldiere and Belgian otvllim escape to Holland* BsM/
lliWMaicadd for a&sost two ime&m betom Being tried, she confessed
tier part is the escapes end ia^ licated. ei#t other pars&xa* %&*& 
ctmlX also admitted that sent of the Allied mM&m® e&e aided 
rojoisKod their unite* ttfa* Seram Cod® provided the death penalty 
is. thee® «a»©s * Bespit® the efforts of American end Spanish diplomatic 
officials to save tor, sh® m s  shot* Barter m s  reported to taire 
Witten on Amrimxx eorre^asdeot that the mmmttm *sjpve os m®mlm 
for another real outburst of seatteat*1*^
la addition to mxclx propaganda Broadside®m the Barm Report* the 
la^lt&afe &ad the Carol! t^eutioa, tte British also miat&med a stoa%
Ijj&xvag® of * assail aanns1* jRdk&lcitjp fire* jtafo of its focue i n  on Anglo* 
American ties* 55a® Osmtegft Fms&hlsts m m  mmmg the major efforts %Moh 
<&tagpte6 to jpsrauad® Snerimui m  the tasi® of their feoads with BgyfrssaA* 
On© pes^hlet for the creation of ®m S^orisl Bwlicjsoal to hind
the Bapiro m  titfvUgr to^eiten each a dsmmtlo -step# th» pellet 
mid, also- mudd prwid® m  mmmm for oioeer relations vitfe Awrica ** 
%  * ♦ the great Desaoem^ ^ lioh m s  separated from m  in the eight**
rnsmh m&twp But is mdted to m  hr a strong in our time of
■ idtrial* * ■# ** ' Still snofeter pts$$&etf written By the m s  Oxford 
oetehiy* ea#haeiae& the need for a Concert of ter >pe* 4 first stop
w«»iim>»iwi*«iij’«''i'>'i|i ■>■■»!■«*»»«*
aj
«e* S3S»# f * 63*
16
8* A* Som»»estei% Idols, of Ito and Peace* Oxford tfaiv&ggttr**:• f «■ ^ ^  a  j* _ **!W*^ EWWWPIF *^ P*l*P**PPfPfllW^ WWW«P^
y a p ^ ets (Londons Oxford Hfciversity W&*19%$}$ p* 19*
17
toward this goal, the writer said, was a little-publicized Anglo-
American peace agreement. This pact provided that in case of dispute,
17
both nations would wait a year before declaring war. Of the British
books distributed in the United States, one by Lord Bryce reflected the
general theme of London’s attempts to influence American public opinion.
Stressing the historic bonds, he noted that both Britain and the United
States had demonstrated a democratic approach in world affairs. For
America, this action was reflected in withdrawing from Cuba and resisting
the temptation to annex Mexican territory. Likewise, his book praised
18British attempts to help Africans achieve self-government. These 
words from English pens were supplemented by stories from London-based 
correspondents for American newspapers. Parker was helpful in arrang­
ing for these journalists to interview British officials, ranging from
19the Prime Minister downward. In these interviews, too, the British 
tried to project the image of idealism -- of a democracy’s battle to 
defeat an autocracy. Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, struck this chord in an interview with an American journalist.
17
E. A. Sonnenschein, Through German Eyes, Oxford University 
Pamphlets (London: Oxford University Press, 191^ -1915)f p. 19,
18
Lord James Bryce, Neutral Nations and the War (London:
Macmillan and Company, Ltd., 191*f), pp. 12-13*
19
It well may have been that such interviews provided a vehicle 
for British propaganda* Granting this, it still was conceivable that 
American editors viewed as legitimate news the comments of such figures 
as Lord Grey.
18
"We want a Europe," he declared, ". • . free from perpetual talks of 
shining armor and warlords*” Bo spoke the voices of Britain*
Whether a treatise by an, Oxford scholar aimed at American intellectuals 
or a patriotic film intended for the “man in the street," Parker’s 
publicists viHifled Germany and wrapped England in the cloak of 
righteousness. Britain was not alone in the campaign to woo America* 
SPhe voices of Germany also spoke*
20
Collected Papers of Sir Edward Grey on the European War, A Free 
Europe* an interview with the Bt* Hon. Sir Edward Grey, British 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, by Edward Price Bell of the 
Chicago Bally Hews (London: T. Fisher Unwin, Ltd., 1916), p. 1*
18
“We want a Europe," he declared, "... free from perpetual talks of
20
shining armor and warlords."
And so went the tenor of British propaganda. Alongside contempo­
rary programs, the English effort perhaps appears crude and primitive. 
Probably it can be said that changes in propaganda techniques since 
World War I have been as dramatic as the development of new weapons.
Yet the psychological "firepower" of British publicity from 191^  to 
1917 surely cannot be denied. It may have lacked the subtlety, the 
sophistication, the social science laboratory concepts of present- 
day propaganda. The men responsible for Britain’s appeal to Americans 
perhaps were not professional propagandists. Certainly, many of them 
were skilled "wordsmiths" who knew how to tell a story. If they 
lacked the refined techniques of contemporary propagandists/ London 
publicists nonetheless packaged their product in the appropriate 
psychological wrappings. (The portrayal of Britons as the defenders 
of democracy; the projection of Germans as primitive barbarians. 
Subtlety may have been missing in this tactic. Even so, the appeal 
was there, playing upon patriotism and democracy. How good was 
this propaganda? Probably the question is unanswerable. Statistical 
studies and scientific opinion polls are not available to assess 
objectively the worth of London publicity. Of necessity, such analyses
20
Collected Papers of Sir Edward Grey on the European War, A Free 
Europe, an interview with the Rt. Hon. Sir Edward Grey, British 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, by Edward Price Bell of the 
Chicago Daily News (London: T. Fisher Unwin, Ltd., 1916), p. 1,
19
largely take the form of value judgments. One other yardstick, though 
certainly far from satisfactory, is to compare Britain's program with 
the German effort. For Berlin, too, waged a propaganda campaign in 
hopes of persuading Americans on the merits of the German cause.
chajotb w  
Berlin's propagajhja. campaign
Count Johann von Bemstorff, the German Ambassador to the United
States, was in Berlin when the war broke out # He was ordered back to
Washington with instructions to "enlighten Americans on the German view*
point."3, Dr# Geheimrat Heinrich Albert of the Ministry of the Interior
came with him to set up a propaganda program* It was Bemstorff,
however, who proved to he the articulate and public relations-minded
German representative # (Me of his first actions was to establish a
news bureau at the Bits Hotel in Hew York City, fhere and at the
German Embassy in Washington, Journalists found refreshments, courtesy
2and an ambassador who was readily available for interviews. A wealthy 
German-American, Hermann Sielcken, offered to pay the salary of a first* 
rate American Journalist to handle Berlin*® press relations in this 
country. His offer stipulated that the German Government must pay the 
charges for transmission of news telegrams to Washington. Berlin dashed 
cold water on the proposal, ruling that' it was not of sufficient impor­
tance to Justify the investment. "Ibis was the way the supply of news 
was organised In a country that imagined it was practicing world 
polities," Bemstorff wrote after the war
1
Millls, ©p. cit., p. TO.
2
Ibid.» p. J2
3
Count Johann von Bemstorff, My *fhree Years in America (Hew York: 
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1920), p. 24.
fbe refusal tb the dirges for e Ms0 M m * ■ ■'■'■i‘!:
Itehington new# Hub d©B*aa&trate& the problems which beset aei?na»y *^ :
dlffi<nftties sMlsir to tte# Of ^ Britain*: ■ Use oal|f- f w m &  departeiitiiiX 
ebopemtion in Berlin was &pre©s ecmfereace heM two or three: times a - 
«M&* ■' Building lie propagen&a /machine from scratch* the B&iitarr1 '■
k
developed & ptism service to report onbattle operations* 
'mrnim Ministry* too#' entered the :£ield* organising a free# -Bureau 
iO 'August*. jjj^  gg& Ijfeijt fijtaBa. reported that the 'bureau* #; $m$m®
apparently was to ■<&&& the Caracas at bOtae* mislead thm about &£l££a*'y 
Q&feioas :sni pradttdlce'tfam against' tbe 'ea^ ** partieolari^ the- ■'■ 
Belgians*^ ' it was said that :m ® m  te&en ':M  August* l$i0* tbisi^se;tb<r ■ ' 
gap between military add oiuiia.au propagenUa operations were' inadequate 
and ;fsf too■ bate* ■' Ifonstheiess* there ■were-' publicists in* wb^ o
attempted to produce pbiieltr which*' it m a  'hoped* would influence'■ 
ibnerican opinion* Q m  such propagandist wote Captain frit# von Bapen*: 
$ewui naval attache In Ifeshington, about an interview with Princess ' 
Leopold of Prussia on nfhs Spartan l$mm in IfcUne- of War.’1 ■ ihe same 
publicist g&& described to the naval attache another btoaftr again
% ■'
bsstwell* |^ *> .pit.** p* Si* ,
5'
as. t e  Ssaa* August 13, s-91 .^
ob the "basis of interviews with members of the German nobility —  con-
7cerning freedom of the seas*
One of the most vocal figures in the Berlin campaign was George
Sylvester Vie reck, an -American journalist of German descent* He and
three friends —  a banker, an accountant and a chemist —  agreed at
war’s outset that German publicity must be strengthened* The result
was establishment of a Hew fork City-based newspaper, The Fatherland.
The first issue, financed by fifty-dollar pledges frcaa each of the
four participants, was published on August 10, 191^ * Bearing the colors
of the Central Powers, The Fatherland was so named as a gesture of
defiance against Germany’s critics* Viereck, who was the editor, said
8the newspaper1® circulation exceeded 100,000* The publication was a
o
voice for the expression of undiluted pro-Germanism* The Fatherland 
aimed sudd venomous attacks at the Wilson Administration that an em­
barrassed Bemstorff tried to take control of the newspaper* Because 
the publication was self-supporting, Viereck managed to resist these
7
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efforts. Revenue came from subscriptions and the purchase at below
10cost of pamphlets and books, which were resold at a profit*
Xn its efforts to influence opinion in the Waited States, Berlin 
encouraged suspicion of the Allies and tried to nourish a pacifist move* 
rnsnt* Germany dwelled on the them that she was the injured party. 
Encircled by powerful and hostile enemies, she had been -forced into a 
defensive war * Her propagandists assailed what they claimed was the‘foes* 
outrageous conduct, fhey accused England of seeking to starve the 
German populace and of violating the laws of war* Germany, so her prop­
aganda said, was a peace-loving nation. Woven into the fabric of this 
publicity was Berlin’s proclamation that her military forces were certain 
to achieve a decisive victory over the Allies* Many wrongs would be 
righted in the peace which followed. Despite the holocaust of war, the
world would be a better place after Germany had smashed Britain and 
11France*
Coupled with the drive to win over Americans were reports of German 
conspiracies and sabotage of munitions plants and arms-laden vessels 
bound for Allied ports. Perhaps the outstanding figure in these intrigues 
was Captain Franz von Riatelen, who arrived in the Gnited States from 
Germany in April, 1915* He began with a plot to place incendiary bombs
10
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in the holds of ammunition ships * After achieving a small measure of
success there* he organized Labor's national Peace Council* Its purpose
m s  to weld together a group of labor union leaders and to demand an
arms embargo; the efforts were ill-starred. Samuel Gompers, president
of the American Federation of Labor, put down a strike at the munitions
factories in Bridgeport* Connecticut. Strikes among longshoremen also
soon were squelched* Finally* President Wilson put Secret Service
agents on the trail of suspected saboteurs. Derriburg returned to denaany
amid the furor over the Lusitania. With the pressure mounting* von
Bintelen left the country in the fall of 1915 end was captured by the
British* The State Department also demanded the recall of Captain von
Papen* the naval attache* for involvement in sabotage. Se left in 
12December* 1915 *
From this point on the course of German publicity efforts was one 
of catastrophe. Dr. Albert's briefcase* stuffed with documents con­
cerning propaganda activities* was stolen on a Hew fork subway. The 
thief* a Secret Service agent* turned the documents over to William G. 
McAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury. He in turn passed some of them along 
to F. X« Cobb* who was editor of the Hew York World and a Wilson confi­
dant. The result was banner headlines about German intrigues in the 
13
Uhited States. Still another disaster followed, lames J. Archibald* 
a® American writer on the German payroll, was removed from his ship at
12
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Falmouth while en route to Berlin. He surrendered numerous documents, 
these included a proposal by Konstantin Dumba, Austrian Ambassador to 
the United States* to incite unrest among Austro-Hungarian workers in 
the munitions plants. It was another Dumba suggestion which provided 
the crowning blow. He wanted to try to influence the course of 
American politics, contending this would provide a foreign policy 
favorable to the Central Powers. These disclosures ended in Dumba*s
ih
recall*
The effect of these revelations —  compounded by the invasion of 
Belgium, the sinking of the Lusitania and the execution of Sdith Cavell —  
added up to failure for Berlin propaganda in America. This was the 
verdict of German officials at post-war hearings. They traced the 
setbacks to a gap between the propaganda image of a peace-loving 
Germany and the portrait of savagery left in the wake of political and 
military actions. "The main difficulty . .. in the United States," the 
German hearings concluded, "was * * * that the policy which was announced 
by the propaganda itself was, again and again, interfered with by 
political incidents."1  ^ The same judgment was made by Bemstorff, who 
criticised Berlin’s failure to foresee the consequences of seeming 
brutality which, he said, contradicted the publicity themes* The diplo­
mat believed that Berlin officials misread the signs when they evaluated
Ik
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Mexican reaction to the war. Their assessment , in his view, was made
on the premise that a profit motive alone was the stimulus to which
Mericans responded. Germany erred, he wrote, in failing to calculate
what Bernstorff called an American tendency to he guided partly by
16emotional values in Judging European affairs.
16
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THE AMERICAN REACTION
President Wilson proclaimed American neutrality on August k,
191^ , the day that Germany "began invading Belgium. The document 
announcing to the world that the United States would maintain a hands- 
off diplomacy was not enough. There yet remained, in Wilson’s view, 
a need to post guidelines for the American people —  an attempt to 
point the direction which thoughts and actions were to take. He 
issued an appeal to the people. "The United States must he neutral 
in fact as well as in name," he said, "during these days that are to 
try men’s souls." The President admonished the citizenry to be im­
partial in both thought and deed, to curb feelings which might reflect
1
favoritism for one of the belligerents.
There were few indicators to determine whether Americans were 
neutral in fact as well as in name. The editors of Literary Digest 
declared, on the basis of a poll, that there was no belligerency
anywhere in the land'. Whether for the Central Powers or the Allies,
2
the editors said, war sympathy was that of a distant observer. They 
made these pronouncements after a war-attitudes survey of 367 news­
paper editors, -the editors were asked to state their own feelings —
1
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pro-Ally# pro-German or neutral; additionally# they worn asked to attempt 
to determine the prevailing sentiments in their communities* The study 
disclosed that- 2kt editors m m  neutral, 105 were pro-Aliy and twenty 
were pra-German, Among the neutral editors# forty-three resided in the 
East#. 112 la. the Midwest# fifty-one in. the South and thirty-six in the 
West. fte pro-Ally list .included thirty-four editors in-, the. East, 
thirteen, in the Midwest# four in the- South and eleven in the West*. Of 
the pro-German editors# one lived in the East# ten in the Midwest# and 
four each in the South and West# Based on the editors* judgments of 
war- attitudes in. their ecmammities# 109 cities and towns were pro-Ally# 
thirty-eight were pro-German and iho were neutral or divided*, Cities 
Where sentiment favored Britain and France included fifty-two in the 
East# forty in the- Midwest# seventy-one in. the South and twenty-six in 
the test* Among conmamities classified m  showing pro-German preferences# 
two- were in the East# twenty-nine in the Midwest# four in the South and 
three in the- lest* The neutral, or divided list of cities included twenty- 
four in the East# sixty-six in the .Midwest# twenty-eight in the South 
mid twenty-two in the West, Hie literary Bluest* projecting, the findings 
on a regional basis, placed Hew England# the South# the Southwest and the 
West in the Allied camp* Pro-German tendencies were Judged to he most 
deep-seated in the Central States and regions of the Far Northwest* In 
each instance these sentiments were .attributed to ancestry or. to large 
numbers of recent immigrants.** It was tuestionahle whether' the. poll ■»•** and
3
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the judgments based on It —  represented valid testing of public opinion. 
Obviously, the absence of door-to-door samplings of attitudes placed 
severe limitations on the survey. Literary Digest, as a substitute, 
elected to accept the newspaper editors* appraisal of the war climate in 
their communities. Conceivably, the poll represented nothing more than the 
views of 367 editors.
"Whatever the state of public opinion, the nation officially was 
neutral. But on the home front as abroad, this policy proved difficult 
in application. There were substantial profits in munitions trade —  and 
jobs for the country*s labor force in war production. Still, the nation 
was neutral; a proclamation attested to this* Controversy soon arose over 
whether the nation could be neutral in both name and fact while selling 
war goods. Pressure for an arms embargo came from the South and the West, 
where there was strong devotion to isolationism. Grain growers and 
cotton planters also resented the shortage of cargo space caused by the 
shipping of munitions. Yet, other economic interests were at stake, too. 
The industrial section of the economy clamored for Washington’s blessing 
on the war goods traffic. The State Department ruled for the manu­
facturers; Robert Lansing, the Department’s counselor when the war broke 
out and successor to William Jennings Bryan as Secretary of State, gave 
the Administration’s approval on October 15, 1914. He held that as a 
neutral, the Government itself could not engage .in this trade. Inter­
national law, however, did not bar private citizens from such manufacturing
4
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and fsmsmvm* tsmtmg said -t 1m- Fresidewt had no.'power to halt the trade* 
and that the Qm&rmmt waa under-no obligation to act merely because 
cue belligerent could not gain access to this mar&et*^ Colonel 'S* M. 
BOuse# a _ fcey Wilson adviser#, arguea against an anas embargo* ■ Such a 
boycott#- he .contended# would have the affect ■&£ violating the nation's 
neutrality by changing a situation which had arisen irrespective.of -any# 
thing America had done* lurhing in the baohground, and jmrbapa over#- -: 
riding the legal technieaiitles# was industrialist Andrew Carnegie's • 
warnings ■ An embargo -could wreck the national prosperity accruing from ■ 
war prof its ^  ■
Still# the issue was .not put to rest even after lensing's ruling and 
O&rnegieVs admonishment* A Wisconsin Congressman# Bepresentative William 
*T* Cary, in December# 1915# called for a boycott on the sale of all goods, 
to belligerents* He reasoned that the'Step was necessary in order to be 
genuinely neutral*, .Additionally# he. said m  embargo would protect the 
nation's trade from hostile acts -of -belligerents and safeguard the public 
from war profiteers*^ the controversy was finally resolved-## at least
5 . . , 1 •
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m 'a domestic issue mi August 22* X%6, when's. resolution calling for 
i  w  ei)t>&rga w  permanently' tablet'%  the’House Committee on Foreign 
Affair* Eepresentative deff 'Mehemore* ■ a. fer&S' Congressman*': introduced
o
the rfeolufclan* fhe move tor a boycott was not' raised again until
Wilson threatened to use it' as a club gainst Britain 'in disputes over
contraband and bl&oiaietiug* Berlin* even thou$i cut off from the market
t$r the British hloefede* did not' protest the policy until after the fettle 
o
of the Marne* '• ■■
Another fencing decision also served' to stimulate the munitions^  trade* 
Beversing a ruling which Bryan fed made at the ward's outset* 'the- State 
Bepartimt counselor held that American business interests could grant 1 
war' credits to belligerents* ■ fhie turnabout stance* m e  iii which Bryan ■ 
concurred* provided the credit that the'.Allies needed to purchase American 
munitions* ' Again* the nation's economic demands were a factor in the 
decision* ' ft was estimated that American Business firms owed' short-term, 
debts of $2CXXmillieu m  Europe when hostilities commenced* 'Banking 
houses pressured Washington to approve war credits as' a 'means, of helping 
pay these debts* Supplementing this agitation from private sources was
lanslng*'s conviction that the teeutive Branch lacked authority to prevent
' ■ inthe transactions *
. Congressional Record* Sixty-Fourth Congress* first Session, Vol*
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In Chicago* fbe product of that meeting was the organisation of the
national Peace Federation! again, Miss AdMm was elected chairman* She
accompanied forty^tvo other American women to m  Mteraation&l Peace
!£>
Conference at *Bm Hague in April* the social reformer ms aided, hr 
such other distinguished Americans as William Howard faft, Nicholas 
.Murray Butler, president of Columbia University, arid David Starr Jordan, 
utoa m s  president of Stanford University and leader of the American 
Peace Society* the Hew forh Peace Society had the Carnegie fortune 
txm which to draw support*. Bryan, vehement in M s  determination that 
the Halted States must not tats up arms, resigned as Secretary of State 
10 1915 because- of foreign policy disputes* He, too, turned M s  full 
energies to- the pacifist movement.
Els was a mission shared hy Henry Ford, whose wealth helped finance 
numerous endeavors in the Quest for peace* Perhaps the most noted ms 
the Ford peace ship, fated to go down in history as a misadventure in 
idealism* Chartering a vessel, the Oscar II, the auto manufacturer 
planned to organise a group of eminent citizens who would go- to Eurppe 
and espouse the gospel of .pacifism* It was hoped they would foment public 
opinion among European, neutrals sufficient to move the war from the battle* 
field to the conference table * fhe ensuing, mediation, according to 
preliminary plans, would bring peace 1 and get the- hoys out of the trenches 
hy Christmas*" Whatever its lofty humanitarian aims, the expedition, was 
doomed even before the Oscar II weighed -anchor m  December A, 1915, team
12
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15radicalism. Words and objectives were not enough for General Wood.
The hero of the Spanish-.American War stormed into action,, establishing
the Plattsburg Movement. The General set up headquarters at Plattsburgh
Hew York. There, under his direction, young business and professional
men underwent a month of military training. Sons of some of the nation’s
most elite families signed up; it was estimated that 1,800 men studied
the rudiments of warfare —  or, more aptly, turned their hand to
"soldiering" —  in 1915 at Plattsburg. It was Wood’s way of filling what
he considered to be the gap left by the Administrationfs refusal to
16
inaugurate a training program.
Meanwhile, Roosevelt’s pen and oratory became more virulent. Sis
was criticism laced with scorn as he denounced the pacifists. Bryan and
his followers were not the real foes of preparedness, the former President
said. He branded them as ". . . too unspeakably silly permanently to delude
the nation." Bather, Wilson’s halfway measures on preparedness posed the 
17genuine peril. Roosevelt was joined in the outcry by the Havy League 
of the United States. Wheeling up all the weapons of publicity it could
19
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Sandwiched between the pacifists and the preparedness supporters 
was tbs league to Enforce the Fence* Hardly m peace. movement in the 
sapid of. Jane Mtoss and Bryan, this organisation' was not designed to 
stop the war* Bather, its purpose was to prevent future conflicts*.
Founded in 191£* the group was likened to a league of nations* %  s 
legal tribunal, a council Of conciliation, new concepts of international, 
law, and economic and, military forces,., the Be&gus was to establish and 
• guarantee 'the future peace Wilson, in what be considered to be bis 
ipost important speech up to that time, endorsed this program at the 
organisation^ May, 1916# National Assembly in. Washington.2  ^ While not 
a'pacifist movement# the league derived j&seh of its support from the 
Weir York Peace -Society*. As the war clouds thickened over- the United 
States in.-1916, numerous pacifists deserted to 'the other- camp>:. Carnegie, 
a principal contributor to the few York Peace Society, began to frown 
m  anti-war activity* . Both that, group and the. league to Enforce the
gk
Feace supported .American entry .into the war*'"
'In retrospect, the .preparedness advocates calculated that' they 
scored '.a decisive victory over the .pacifists* :fbe attempt to credit 
Wilsonis re-election in 1916 to a peace theme —  nhe kept us out of war” ** 
was perhaps a superficiai Judgment . It was: questionable whether- bit
22 .
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return to office by a popular majority of only 568,822 votes -- 
9,116,296 for Wilson and 8,5^7,47^ for Republican Charles Evans 
Hughes —  could be construed as an outpouring of pacifist sentiment. 
Indeed, the President tended to identify himself with the "carry a 
big stick" philosophy in June, 1916, when he led a preparedness 
parade of 60 thousand marchers in the nation*s capital*^ Prepa- 
rationists counted it another victory when Wilson on August 21,
1916, signed a $600 million naval construction bill calling for the 
completion of 156 new ships by July 1, 1919* The nation was loading 
its arsenals that summer and fall# Although the pacifists kept 
talking, the groundswell for peace which Jane Addams thought she 
saw in 1913 proved to be only a mirage. The United States was on 
the road to war. Numerous scholars later claimed British propa­
ganda was a driving force in charting America*s course.
25
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CHAPTER VI
THE CASE AGAINST BRITISH PROPAGANDA
In the war*s aftermath, numerous scholars of neutrality advanced 
the thesis that the United States need not have been a party to the 
conflict. They contended it was London publicity which almost single- 
handedly laid the foundation for America*s decision to take up arms.. 
By playing on public sentiment and influencing the Administration, 
these scholars said, England made a mockery of Wilsonian neutrality. 
Greedy for munitions profits and pro-Ally at heart, the nation closed 
its eyes to Anglo violations of international law. Conversely, 
Washington kept its hand on a loaded gun in dealing with Kaiser 
Wilhelm*s regime. This two-edged diplomacy —  a turn-the-other- 
eheek attitude toward London and an on-guard stance against Berlin — . 
finally reached the point of no return. Having played out its hand 
on issues which might have been resolved in a strict application of 
neutrality, Washington was left with no alternatives to war in April, 
1917* Such were the views of some scholars in analyzing the reasons 
for the American decision. In all of this they detected the thread 
of British propaganda. Indeed, they saw it as more than a thread; 
rather, they conceived it to be a hangman*s noose.
Among the students of World War I who advanced this thesis 
were' Walter Millis, H. C. Peterson, Harry Elmer Barnes, James D. 
Squires, Edwin Borchard and William Potter Lage. Millis wrote that 
for years the American public had received its day-by-day picture of 
Europe through a British perspective. He noted that few American 
newspapers maintained European staffs. In other cases Europeans
40
often manned the foreign bureaus of American newspapers. The head of
The New York Times bureau in London was an Englishman, as was most of
his staff. The New York World* s London correspondent was an Irishman
who had never been in the United States. Beyond this, he declared,
those correspondents who were American citizens often had become
’’Europeanized" in thinking and outlook. Against this background, most
New York newspapers sided with the Allies when war broke out. These
pro-Ally publications included The New York Times, which Millis
credited with perhaps giving the most serious attention to European
2events of any American newspaper. That newspaper branded Germany’s
drive into Belgium, as "* . . aggression pure and simple . . . .
He also criticized The New York Times for having retained James
M. Beck, a former assistant attorney general of the United States,
to examine German and British diplomatic correspondence in an attempt
to fix the blame for the war. "Mr. Beck seems not to have doubted,"
the author observed, "his ability to arrive, upon these partial and
4patently unsatisfactory disclosures, at a sound judgment." The Times 
printed Beck's conclusions, which Millis tenaed a "flaming defense of
1
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the Allies and castigation of the Central Powers," on October 25,
5
191^ * Instantly popular, the article was reprinted in pamphlet
form. Beck later expanded it into a hook, The Evidence in the Case,
6
which Millis called "... another triumph of pro-Ally propaganda."
Beck concluded that Germany and Austria secretly acted to impose their
will upon Europe; he said it could not be determined whether they
intended to ignite a general war. Beck claimed that Germany, although
having the power to induce Austria to pursue a reasonable course,
obviously prodded Vienna in taking an unreasonable position. Further,
he contended, England and its Allies made every possible concession
in the hope of preserving peace. Germany precipitated hostilities by
declaring war against Russia when peace conferences were still in
progress; Berlin’s invasion of Belgium was without provocation and
violated Belgium’s inherent rights as a sovereign state; England
7was bound by treaty to defend Belgium. Along the same vein, Millis 
pointed out that The New York Times on August 9, 191^ , devoted its 
Sunday magazine to a book, Germany and the Next War, by General 
Friedrich von Berahardi. Within the next several days there was 
overwhelming demand for the book, which contended that war was the 
instrument to make Germany a great power. Millis noted that no one
5
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bothered to reprint similar works of other military writers in the
Entente countries or the United States. Soon, the historian said,
the "... stupefied Germans discovered themselves convicted before
world opinion on the evidence of a few writers whom the vast majority
8
of Germans had never read. ..." Such material, Millis said,
9
provided highly effective ammunition for British publicity. On the 
other side of this propaganda coin was Hudson Maxim*s book, Defenseless 
America. Written in the heat of the preparedness movement by an 
American manufacturer of high explosives, the book was the inspiration 
for a movie, ’The Battle Cry of Peace." Discussing the film, Millis 
wrote that hundreds of thousands of Americans saw this "... gory 
piece of propaganda for preparedness. They were . . . horrified by 
its portrayal of an unprepared America overrun by the brutal . . . 
soldiery of a foreign power which . . . uniformed its soldiers in a 
strangely close imitation of the Germans.
Like Millis, Peterson saw in British propaganda the driving 
force which largely dictated America*s decision for war. He con­
tended that United States ultimately joined the Allies because 
Washington had surrendered claim to neutrality by giving material, 
diplomatic and moral support to London and Paris. Norway, Sweden,
8
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Denmark and Holland refrained from what he termed this "unneutral
conduct.1 Policies of the Scandinavian countries and The Netherlands
11
enabled them to stay clear of the conflict* The reason America did
not follow this course* he wrote* was because of British propaganda.
All the persuasiveness of this publicity -- the portrayal of German
savagery and the image of England’s fight to save democracy —  was
accepted at face value in America. "With President Wilson it was
especially important*" Peterson wrote* "influencing him to such an
extent that he subordinated the American desire for peace with his
12
own desire for an Anglo-French victory." In building his case 
against British propaganda* he relied to a great extent on the 
American Press Resume. Issued weekly or bi-weekly from April 12*
19159 to August 8* 1917; this report was a focal point upon which 
numerous efforts to educate American opinion were based. One column 
in the Resume was headed "Influencing the American Press." This 
represented a summary of war articles in American newspapers* pro­
viding a measure of the impact of London publicity in the United 
States. The Resumes also contained detailed accounts of Parker’s
correspondence with people in America. Such correspondence helped
13pinpoint strengths and weaknesses in the British effort.
11
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In remedying weaknesses, according to Peterson, British propa­
gandists resorted to distortion of fact. Their techniques included 
telling only that part of the truth which aided their cause; the 
utilization of background material to imply things for which there 
was no evidence; exploiting the emotions and ideals of those at whom 
the propaganda was aimed; giving their publicity an aura of authority 
by using big names, quoting the enemy or appealing to legality; they
used simple arguments and eliminated qualifying statements; they used
Ik
endless repetition. Expanding on this theme, Peterson said the
British in some instances used outright falsehoods. He termed these
untruths relatively unimportant; rather, it was easier and safer to
give warped interpretations. The author said that by ignoring mention
of good Germans, all Germans were made to appear degenerate. By
omitting reference to evil Englishmen, the Germans were made to appear
even worse. This technique of exploiting part-truths became high art
15
with London publicists. Peterson singled out the Bryce Report as 
a prime piece of propaganda in the context of presenting half-truths 
and distortions. For instance, this study of alleged atrocities con­
tained an account of three German soldiers who decapitated a baby
l6while the parents stood helplessly by. The historian termed this
Ik
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merely a new version of an atrocity story told during the Spanish-
American War. In that version, Spanish soldiers chopped infants to
17pieces, again in the presence of the parents. Noting the shock many 
Americans felt about supposed German atrocities, Peterson said an 
attempt to offset the impact of British propaganda was lost in the 
waves of emotion and frenzy which swept the country. A group of 
American newspapermen sent a telegram to the Associated Press assert­
ing that charges of German cruelties and barbarous acts were ground­
less. The American journalists were in Belgium shortly after the
German invasions. This impartial report from then neutral observers
18
had little impact in their homeland.
As did Millis and Peterson, Barnes severely indicted London
publicists. Beyond this, he contended that resources of American
finance and industry were directed wholly to the defense of the
Allied powers and support of their propaganda. This stance of
American economic interests was attributed in large measure to
19
greed for war profits. The nation’s press, according to Barnes, 
followed the dictates of finance and industry; thus, most of the 
leading newspapers were staunchly pro-Ally by 1915 s^id 1916. This 
favoritism extended to the point that Englishmen actually took
17
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control of some newspapers. Chief among the sources that Barnes
used to buttress this thesis was material from journalist and author
Upton Sinclair, who accused The New York Times of trying to force
the nation into the war. Indeed, he said propaganda was reflected in
its news columns as well as on the editorial page. As a,n example,
Sinclair noted that the newspaper on November 26, 1915 j published
excerpts from the Thanksgiving Day sermons of eleven New York City
clergymen. The story*s headline said: "Preparedness Plea From
Many Pulpits; Thanksgiving Sermons Justify War for Defense of
American Liberty and Ideals." Despite this headline, Sinclair said,
only three of the sermons contained statements which might have been
21
construed as endorsing propaganda. Nor was Sinclair’s criticism 
limited to newspapers; he had equally harsh words for some of the 
magazines, McClure’s, he declared, became an exponent for prepared­
ness even before war broke out. Current Opinion dropped its policy 
of reprinting from other publications and introduced propaganda of
its own. Literary Digest, supposedly an impartial survey of public
22
opinion, became an organ of hate. As for Barnes, he did not con­
fine his charges of pro-Ally sentiments to the press and finance
20
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7^and industry. Indeed,, he accused American officials of falling prey 
to Anglo publicity. He singled out Walter Hines Page, American 
ambassador to Britain during the war. Hie historian charged that 
the diplomat’s pro-British leanings impaired American neutrality. 
Foreign policy from l$dA to 1919 j he wrote, would have been far dif­
ferent had the United States possessed at the Court of St. James an
23
ambassador who was competent, fair-minded and judicious. Page’s
". . . maladministration of his duties," Barnes wrote, "was a chief
obstacle to American impartiality in dealing with the belligerent 
, 2k
nations after 191*t." Another scholar of neutrality, C. Hartley
Grattan, provided much of the ammunition for Barnes. Page was
guilty, Grattan wrote, of swallowing "... the whole of British
,25
propaganda, hook, line and sinker. Hie ambassador failed to 
realize, he added, that Germany was not alone in the use of propa­
ganda; Britain also resorted to it. Page constantly repudiated 
German opinions as propaganda; he invariably supported English 
opinions, no matter how much distorted, as the truth. "This propa­
ganda achieved the amazing coup," Grattan observed, "of writing
23
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. . . the official communications of the American ambassador to 
26
London.M
Less venomous than Barnes in his attack on Anglo publicity, 
Squires concluded that British propaganda was at least a major con­
tributing factor in bringing America into the war. There never will 
be agreement, he wrote, on the degree to which England*s publicists 
influenced the Washington decision. "It was not the cause," he said, 
"for American entrance into the World War. But that it was a cause,
and a powerful one, it seems impossible for the historian today to 
27
deny." He termed his conclusion identical with that of another
28
student of war propaganda, Ralph Lutz. Whether Squires and Lutz 
actually reached identical conclusions is perhaps open to question. 
Unlike Squires, Lutz was far less specific in attempting to weigh 
the impact of British propaganda on America. Whereas Squires termed 
the publicity "a cause, and a very powerful one” in charting 
Washington*s course, Lutz said only that propaganda "... was not
,,29the determining factor in forcing the United States into the war. 
Certainly, the two scholars were in accord on the issue that propa-. 
ganda was not the principal cause. Yet, Lutz did not even attempt
26
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to assess the influence of propaganda as a powerful influence. In 
this sense, his analysis was not identical with that of Squires.
Squires wrote that two immediate causes —  German resumption of
unrestricted warfare and interception of the Zimmermann Telegram —
30 -underpinned,jthe Washington decision. In addition, he found six
underlying causes. These included the Anglo-American bonds forged 
by culture, language and history; indignation in the United States 
over Germany's invasion of Belgium; a fear, especially along the 
Atlantic seaboard, that a Berlin victory would imperil American 
safety; the fact that by 191? the nation had a tremendous stake in 
an Allied victory; shock at the cruelty and brutality of modem war­
fare, epitomized by the sinking of the Lusitania; finally, the impact
31
of British propaganda. "Skillfully interweaving itself into the 
other five elements," Squires wrote, "... the British propaganda
32
was a force of real potency in compelling the decision of April 6."
As witness to the skill and cunning of London publicists, he offered 
Ambassador Bemstorff. Declaring that Americans were fair game for 
anything clothed in sentiment, the German diplomat said that British 
propaganda exploited this circumstance "... with the greatest 
refinement in the case of the German invasion of ’poor little
30
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Belgium** the shooting of the * heroic nurse** Edith Cavell, and other 
„33incidents. Squires also noted that Secretary of the Treasury 
McAdoo praised the expertise of London publicists. McAdoo wrote that 
an artistic unity and singleness of purpose characterized British 
propaganda in the United States. London gradually built up the im­
pression that the Germans were barbarians. Eventually, he wrote, the 
British convinced a large number of Americans that German soldiers
3*
had cut off the hands of Belgian children.
Two other scholars of neutrality, Borchard and Lage, declared
that Anglo publicity, playing on a naive America, succeeded in making
35
the United States an instrument of England's foreign policy. It 
was their view that Washington, neutral in stated policy, was un­
neutral in practice almost from the war's outset. Their documentation 
for this came from Ray Stannard Baker, who wrote that by October,
191^ , the United States was no longer neutral; heavy trade carried
with it, even if informally and undeclared, a commitment to the 
36
Allied cause. Borchard and Lage maintained that the United States 
adopted a hostile attitude toward Germany when grievances arose over
33
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neutrality. Conversely, the policy toward Britain was a go-softly
approach even on issues of major importance. Legal questions might
have been approached with far more understanding had the United States
37been neutral in practice as well as in name. As one example of this 
double-edged diplomacy, the authors cited the American position con­
cerning armed merchantmen. In what they termed an "unsustainable 
position," Washington held that German submarines had no right to fire 
on or sink an aimed merchantman which had Americans on board* And
this despite the British Admiralty *s orders to ram or fire at sub- 
38marines on sight. Thus, in the view of these two scholars, the 
United States undertook to defend British merchantmen from attack by 
their enemy.
Borchard and Lage saw the influence of Lansing in this two­
pronged neutrality. As early as July, 1915> they said, Lansing 
admitted his pro-Ally sympathies. During the furor over the Lusitania, 
he drafted a personal memorandum concluding that Berlin was hostile 
toward all nations with democratic institutions. Declaring that 
Germany must not be allowed to win the war, his memorandum said
American public opinion had to be conditioned for eventual abandon-
39ment of neutrality in favor of joining the fight for democracy.
37
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Borchard and Lage also noted Lansing*s admission that diplomatic corre­
spondence to Britain was couched in language designed to help prevent 
a rupture in relations. The Secretary of State said that his dis­
patches were steeped in verbosity, opening up new topics of discussion 
rather than ending those in controversy* Short, emphatic correspond­
ence, he wrote, carried the peril of damaging beyond repair the bonds 
of friendship between the United States and England. Often, Lansing 
said, he feared his notes might have demanded too much of Britain.
All of this careful attention to detail was in preparation for the
40
day when America would enter the war on the British side. Borchard
and Lage also emphasized Wilson’s pro-Ally sentiments. For example,
only eight days after issuing the Declaration of Neutrality, Wilson
told Colonel House that a German victory would change the course of
41
civilization and make the United States a military nation. Xt was 
in this context —  a two-edged diplomacy shaped largely by British 
propaganda —  that a gullible America took up arms in 1917; accord­
ing to these scholars of neutrality.
It is, of course, impossible to know what direction American 
public opinion and Wilsonian diplomacy would have taken had that 
propaganda not been present. Many of the works that attempt to pin­
point London publicity as the fundamental cause for American entry
40
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into the war were written on the eve of World War XI, Indeed, scholars
of neutrality were dealing not only with the past; perhaps it is fair
to say their conclusions may have been influenced in part by what they
saw, or thought they saw, in the contemporary scene of the 1930* s:
The specter of a repetition of ISlk-lSYJ 9 with British propaganda at
the forefront as a force which might lead the United States into an
unnecessary war. One Wilsonian scholar, Arthur S, Link, believed
these students of neutrality attached too much importance to London
publicity. Writing in 195^ */ he detected a superficiality in studies
k2
of World War I propaganda. Minimizing London propaganda as a
molder of public opinion in the United States, he expressed doubt that
Americans of the 191^-191? scene were as uninformed about the origins
3^of the war as a later generation believed. Nor did he conclude that 
German propaganda was a failure. "Far from being inept and unsuited 
to the American mentality," Link wrote, "much of the German propa- 
ganda was skillfully executed . . . ." In his view, Berlin’s 
publicity effort did not fail because of blunders. Rather, it was 
because a majority of thoughtful Americans had made up their minds 
on the causes and issues of the war ahead of the time that either
k2
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German or British propaganda agencies were effectively at work in the
United States. At the root of this thinking, he wrote, was a fear of
German naval ambitions in the Caribbean and a mistrust of Kaiser
Wilhelm and his military advisers. Even more important were Germany* s
actions immediately before and after the outbreak of hostilities.
Failure to submit the Serbian question to arbitration and violation of
Belgian neutrality were regarded as defiance of the moral conscience 
45
of the world. It was not, Link wrote, British propaganda, atrocity
stories and emotionalism which shaped the preponderant American
thinking during the first months of the war. Rather, opinion was
shaped by a fairly keen analysis of world affairs and an awareness
of German actions. This thinking was strengthened by subsequent
events, especially submarine warfare. It was easy to overestimate
the importance of the Bryce Report, he said, noting that Wilson
46
refused to believe the atrocity stories. These questions then are 
posed: Was it a gullible America, propelled by British propaganda,
that went to war in 1917? Or was it an America pursuing an inde­
pendent course?
45
Ibid.
DECISION FOB WAR
As late as December 1916, Wilson still hoped that American peace 
overtures might silence the guns of August and relight the lamps of 
Europe* In the previous two and one-half years both London and Berlin 
had strained his diplomacy to the breaking point. England, abandoning 
the provisions for rights of neutrals set forth in the Declaration of 
London, laid down her own rules on contraband and search and seizure. 
Washington protested with regularity, claiming the rules were unduly 
harsh and often in conflict with international law. London’s responses 
frequently were unsatisfactory. The widening gulf in Anglo-American 
relations during the summer and fall of 1916 posed complex issues on 
the lengths to which Wilson and the Congress would go in enforcing 
rights of neutrality. Confrontations with Britain were tempered in part 
by U-boat warfare and other bones of contention in German-American 
relations. It was indeed, a two-front diplomatic struggle for Washington.
The stage for conflict between England and the United States was
set when war broke out. A pivotal point was the Declaration of London,
drafted on February 26, 1909* but never ratified by any nation. Despite
this weakness, it was the only concise statement of neutral trade rights
existing in 191^ . The agreement allowed great freedom for non-belligerent
commerce and specifically exempted from seizure as contraband such
1important American exports as copper ore and cotton. Washington requested
1
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that both London and Berlin adhere to the Declaration. Germany made 
her approval contingent upon British willingness to abide by the pact; 
England said she would observe the agreement only with severe modi­
fications. She quickly issued a succession of Orders in Council which 
drastically changed the Declaration’s provisions on belligerent rights 
to interfere with neutral commerce. For example, the 1909 agreement 
classified balloons, airplanes and their accessory parts as conditional 
contraband —  subject to capture only if it was shown they were destined 
for an enemy Government. Britain proclaimed these items absolute contra­
band —  liable to seizure if they were bound for a foe or to territory
2
the enemy owned or occupied. England’s unyielding attitude convinced 
Lansing that it was futile to press for belligerent adherence to the 
Declaration. Wilson, adopting the same view, approved Lansing’s note to 
Britain withdrawing Washington insistence on the agreement as the basis 
for American demands concerning neutral trade rights. The message, 
sent on October 22, 191^ , proclaimed treaties and international law as 
the criteria for American rights. The United States reserved the right 
to lodge a protest each time her trade privileges were violated.
London responded on October 29 by expanding the list of prohibited 
exports. Classified as absolute contraband were motor tires, rubber,
2
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mineral oils, gasoline and unwrought copper. Placed in the conditional
k
category were hides, pigskins and leather. The British Admiralty on
November 2 classified the North Sea as a war area; neutral trading
5
vessels were warned of grave dangers from mines and warships. England
on March 11, 1915,? began a naval blockade of Germany. British prize
courts were empowered to condemn goods sent to the Scandinavian countries
and Holland which might have reached Germany by evasion of neutral export
boycotts; additionally, the courts also could confiscate goods which might
replace other items to be shipped from the neutral stock of Scandinavia
or The Netherlands. Raw goods en route to neutral ports were condemned
if it was thought they could be manufactured into products which might 
6
reach Germany. Wilson’s initial response was merely a dispatch assert­
ing his expectation that the blockade would not violate international 
law.  ^ In August, however, London placed cotton on the absolute contra­
band list, jeopardizing the American South’s economy. A furor followed; 
on October 21, Washington protested in a communication which amounted
Q
w. . . to an indictment of the entire British policy. ..." The dis­
patch censured England’s practice of detaining neutral cargoes without clear
h
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proof of destination and announced the United States would not be bound
by decisions of British prize courts. Although the protest strongly-
criticized the blockade, there was no demand to lift it; nor did
q
Washington threaten reprisals. Legality of the blockade was at issue 
because London did not proclaim it as such. Even so, the effect was 
the same, because the British fleet closed nearly all water entrances 
to Germany.^
London took some of the hostility out of the contraband lists by
making substantial purchases of American cotton, helping stabilize the 
11crop’s price. But other grave issues counteracted this gesture.
Britain and France on July 7> 1918, formally discontinued all observance
of the Declaration of London. Instead, they would be bound by the
12principles of international law. London fomented another storm on 
July 18 by blacklisting eighty-five American firms; this prohibited 
British subjects from doing business with any of these companies. The 
action was based on the belief that the firms had commercial links with 
Germany, Particularly, they were suspected of doing business with 
Germans in South America. Washington protested on July 26, a Wednesday.
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A memorandum issued with the formal communication noted the blacklisting
had aroused an intense anti-British feeling in the United States.
Because of this animosity, the State Department told Britain of plans to
13inform American newspapers of the protest on Saturday. The complaint
accused London of brushing aside neutral trade rights in blacklisting
the companies. "It is manifestly out of the question," the protest
asserted, "that . . . the United States should acquiesce in such . . .
1 a
punishment to its citizens." England attempted to mollify the State
Department and American public opinion. Sir Cecil Spring-Riee, British
Ambassador to the United States, assured Washington that specific
grievances would be taken up and, if justified, individual firms removed 
15from the list. Such gestures lacked the substance to calm Washington.
Wilson pressed for retaliatory powers; Congress responded, enacting
legislation which permitted the President to stop the importation of
all goods from the Allies and to deny clearance to ships that would not
transport products for the blacklisted firms. In effect, he was armed
with the economic weapons to embargo the export of munitions to the 
l6Allies. The stage was set and the props at hand for a showdown; the
13
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curtain did not go up. This was due in part to another stage. Along­
side Britain stood Germany as a powerful belligerent with which Wilson 
had to deal in his pursuit of neutrality.
Countering what German statesmen called London’s "mockery of all 
principles of the laws of nations," Germany on February 1915# 
designated the English Channel as a war zone. Neutral ships were warned 
to stay clear of those waters. Accidents were bound to occur, the
decree said, even though the German Navy had been instructed not to fire 
ITon neutral ships. Washington said it would construe any loss of
American lives or vessels at German hands as ". . .an indefensible
18violation of neutral rights. ..." The American position posed a 
dilemma for Germany. On the one hand there was Chancellor Theobald 
Bethmann-Kollweg’s determination to keep the United States out of war; 
this was countered by the German Admiralty’s insistence on U-boat war­
fare . 19 Then came the torpedoing of the Lusitania. Washington told 
Berlin that expressions of regret and offers of reparation, even if they 
satisfied international obligations, were not sufficient to justify the 
use of submarines against neutrals. The communication, emphasizing the 
right of Americans to travel where they pleased on the high seas, asked
IT
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Berlin to disavow the acts of its submarine commanders and to make certain
20that there was no recurrence. Germany’s response simply challenged
the facts concerning the sinking and invited prolonged debate; she
21
offered little hope for curtailing of U-boat warfare. Wilson had to 
make a key decision; Whether to go softly as advocated by Bryan or to 
pursue the aggressive course urged by Lansing and House. The President 
elected the latter course and Bryan resigned in protest. Washington 
dispatched a second note to Berlin on June 9> 1915j declaring the United 
States could not admit the legality of the English Channel as a war zone. 
To do so, the communication said, would negate the rights of United 
States shipmasters and American citizens to go where legitimate business 
took them; this included travel on belligerent ships. Washington viewed
op
these rights as inviolable.
Despite the aggressiveness in stating the American position, little 
real headway was made in resolving the differences. Although Wilson’s 
attitude toward Germany was described as patient, he refused to retreat 
from the position that German submarine commanders must spare American 
lives.^ 3 Then came another crisis. Two Americans perished when a U-boat
20
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sack the British liner Arabic on August 19, 1915* In the uproar which
followed, Bemstorff went the limit —  and perhaps even exceeded his
authority —  in trying to soothe the Wilson Administration. He assured
the State Department that U-boats henceforth would give due warning
and provide for the safety of non-combatants before torpedoing 
24passenger ships. Wilson by now largely was keeping his own counsel 
in shaping American policy toward Germany. Both House and Lansing 
advised drastic action after the Arabic was sunk. House wanted to con­
vene an emergency session of Congress; Lansing favored severing
25
relations with Germany. The President rejected both proposals.
The next major confrontation between the two nations did bring a
threat from Washington to break off diplomatic ties. The French steamer
Sussex, an unarmed vessel used for Channel crossings, was torpedoed
without warning by a U-boat on March 24, 1916. Several of the twenty-
four Americans aboard were injured. The torpedoing of the steamer was
called, to that point in the war, the gravest crisis in German-American 
26
diplomacy. Wilson went before Congress to assail Berlin. The German 
Government, he said, had been unable to put any restraints on submarine 
warfare. He reiterated the American position: Use of U-boats was
24
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incompatible with the principles of humanity and the long-established
27rights of neutrals. The State Department sent an ultimatum to Berlin 
on April l8. U-boat attacks, the dispatch said, were flagrant offenses 
against what the United States considered to be ", . . the sacred and 
indisputable rights of international and universally recognized dictates 
of humanity. ..." If the U-boat raids continued, the communication
28said, Washington's only recourse would be to sever diplomatic relations. 
This stance again pitted Bethmann-Hollweg against the Admiralty; again, 
the Chancellor emerged victorious. He won from the Kaiser and the 
Admiralty the most far-reaching concessions yet made to the United States. 
In a dispatch on May 4, Berlin stated it would go to the utmost lengths 
in order to preserve German-American harmony. Berlin believed that 
naval warfare should be confined to belligerents, thereby guaranteeing 
freedom of the seas for neutrals. With this view, the communication said, 
Germany had instructed her naval forces not to fire on merchant ships 
without giving warning; additionally, submarine commanders had been 
ordered to make provision for saving human lives. The only exceptions 
would be where vessels offered resistance or attempted to escape. Berlin 
stipulated one important reservation: Washington was expected to under­
take negotiations with Britain which would restore freedom of the seas 
for neutrals. A cutback in submarine warfare, therefore, was contingent
27
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upon America’s ability to end the blockade. If Washington failed in
these efforts, then Germany would reserve complete liberty of action
29regarding future submarine warfare. The United States refused to 
recognize this condition; an American note informed Bethmann-Hollweg 
that the submarine policy could not be " * . . contingent upon the course 
or result of diplomatic relations between the Government of the United
O Q
States and any other belligerent Government* . . . Germany did not 
reply to this dispatch.
With Berlin’s modification of U-boat warfare, there appeared in the 
late fall and winter of 1916 a kind of impasse in American pursuit of 
neutrality. Wilson attempted to press his case against London, lodging 
protests and arming himself with weapons to counter what he considered 
to be British encroachments on American commerce. Yet, he did not 
resort to economic sanctions which might have crippled the Allied war 
effort. The influence of House and Lansing may have tempered the 
President’s actions. And whatever the complaints against Britain, the 
nation’s war prosperity was very real. There also was the upcoming 
election. These were the issues immediately at hand. Beyond all of 
these —  and perhaps overshadowing them —  was Wilson’s fervent wish to 
see peace restored. Re-elected in November, the President made an effort 
toward that end. His bid was preceded by a German peace feeler on 
December 12, 1916. The overture, transmitted through diplomatic channels
29
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of America and other neutrals, renewed the contention that the war had
been forced on Germany. Boasting of military and economic strength,
the Kaiser’s Government pronounced itself ready to fight to the end.
Nonetheless, without offering specific details, Berlin declared a
31
willingness to negotiate. Wilson dispatched a communication to
belligerents on December 18 suggesting they outline their conditions for
peace, ©lis request for disclosure of specific demands placed Germany
in an embarrassing position. Both Bethmann-Hollweg and Arthur Zimmermann,
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, believed a statement of peace
terms would be disadvantageous to their country. Zimmermann also feared
a Wilson role in negotiations. Distrusting the American President, the
German Foreign Secretary wished at all costs to prevent him from having
32
a hand in a settlement.
Because of this unwillingness to state her terms and the suspicion
of Wilson, Germany framed an ambiguous reply. Berlin referred to its
own overture of December 12 and asked the warring nations assemble on
33neutral ground to consider peace. There was no mention of terms. The 
reply was an important turning point in German policy toward the United 
States. For one thing, the vagueness made it easier for the Allies to
31
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rebuff all peace feelers. More important, it hastened the deterioration 
of prospects for creating a peace alternative to U-boat warfare. The 
Berlin communication, and the skepticism toward Wilson which was a factor 
in its wording, compounded Germany*s problems in using submarines while 
remaining at peace with the United States.
Replying on December 29 to the proposals for talks, the Allies 
branded the Berlin offer as being without substance. HA suggestion with­
out any conditions for initiating negotiations,?l Britain and France 
said, "is not an offer of peace. y Wilson kept his hopes alive despite 
these setbacks. Addressing the Senate on January IT, 1917, the 
President urged the family of nations to adopt the Monroe Doctrine on . 
an international scope. He suggested that no nation should seek to
dominate another; rather, all nations, both great and small, should be
36free to develop according to their own lights. These idealistic 
aspirations soon were washed away in the currents of realism. Indeed, 
although he did not know it, time had run out even before his address 
to the Senate. On January 9, with the prospect for peace negotiations 
apparently doomed, Germany decided to renew unrestricted submarine warfare.
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Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg and General Ludentiorff, who had taken 
over the Supreme High Command in August, 1916, were unrelenting in the 
quest for total U-boat offensives. Bethmann-Hollweg managed to stay 
them until the January 9 Crown Council meeting, when the militarists 
won their case in a presentation before Kaiser Wilhelm. Unlimited 
submarine attacks would leave England prostrate within six months, well 
ahead of the time that America’s possible entry into the war could be 
decisive. Ludendorff said the Supreme High Command would not be respon­
sible for the war if U-boat restrictions continued. Bethmann-Hollweg 
warned that giving the submarines license to kill might bring the United
States into the war. Willing to risk conflict with America, the Kaiser
37
approved full revival of submarine action.
The next development came on the very day Wilson proposed a Monroe 
Doctrine for the world. Britain on January 19 intercepted the Zimmermann 
Telegram to the German Embassy in Mexico City. 3y January 24 the tele­
gram had been decoded and the contents transmitted to Washington. 
Zimmermann revealed Germany's plan to resume unrestricted U-boat warfare 
on February 1. Berlin hoped the action would not draw America into the 
struggle. Failing this, Zimmerraaim proposed a German-Mexican alliance. 
For Mexico, there was the promise of German financing and the lure of
regaining territory in Texas, Hew Mexico and Arizona. The Mexican Govern-
38ment, of course, rejected the proposal. Berlin's official notice to
37
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Washington concerning resumption of a^ total submarine offensive was 
delivered on January 31. Accusing the Allies of rejecting peace over­
tures in favor of a war to crush her, Germany said full U-boat warfare
was the only recourse. After February 1, all ships, including neutrals,
39would be sunk in a war zone around Britain, France and Italy. Wash­
ington reaction was immediate; a communication from Lansing to Bemstorff 
on February 3 announced the severing of German-American relations. The
Secretary of State noted the American warning of April, 1916, concerning
40unrestricted submarine warfare. Going before Congress to announce the
diplomatic break, Wilson still sought to fan the embers of his peace
aspirations. "• . .1 refuse to believe," he said, "that it is the
intention of the German authorities to do in fact what they have warned
4lus they will feel at liberty to do."
Only twenty-three days later the President was again before Congress —  
this time to seek approval for the arming of American merchantmen. The 
Germans had sunk two American vessels, the Housatonic and the Lyman M.
Law. Shipowners1 unwillingness to put their vessels to sea in the face 
of the U-boat threat was damaging American commerce. Wilson expressed 
hope of averting war. "The American people do not want it," he declared,
39
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“and our desire is not different from theirs.” Yet, the loss of lives
and shipping continued. Germany sank seven American ships during
ks
February and March with a loss of thirty-six lives. J To Lansing, this 
prefaced only one course —  war. His certainty of the outcome was 
expressed in a communication to the President on March 17* Aimed con­
flict was inevitable, the Secretary of State wrote, because of Germany’s
continuing attacks on American shipping. An incident was bound to
kkarise which would provoke war. Wilson clung to his goals for peace.
He was told at a Cabinet meeting on March 20 that public pressure might 
force his hand on the war issue. "I do not care for public demand,” he 
replied. “I want to do right, whether popular or not.”^  The end was near 
even as he spoke. That very day he and the Cabinet decided to call an 
emergency session of Congress and seek a declaration of war against 
Germany. The nation’s lawmakers convened on April 2 to hear the 
Administration’s request. The President decried Berlin's war on non­
belligerent shipping, the German sabotage campaign in the United States,
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and the intrigues of the Zimmermann Note* Wilson said that vessels of
every kind, including hospital ships hound for Belgium, were being
sent to the bottom. "The . • • German submarine warfare against
k6commerce is warfare against mankind," he asserted. Congress concurred; 
the American decision was a declaration of war against Germany.
k6
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CONCLUSION
World War I ushered in numerous new techniques of warfare; these * 
advances were not limited to technology. ' In a social and political 
sense, the emergence of propaganda as a force to influence public opinion 
was perhaps as significant as developments in weaponry. '-The war was not 
confined to the battlefield; there was the "other front" where the 
belligerents fought to win world-wide public favor for themselves.
Indeed, so intense was this struggle —  the war of propaganda that 
some scholars held it chiefly responsible for bringing America into the 
battle against Germany. They proclaimed British publicity as the driving 
force behind Washington*s decision to take up arms*
London began at the war*s outset to build a propaganda machine.
An operation largely veiled in secrecy, it often was frustrated by 
departmental friction and duplication of effort. Not until Lloyd George 
became Prime Minister did the English achieve a semblance of unity in 
this field* He first established a Department of Information and placed 
a Cabinet Minister, Lord Carson, in charge of it. Even this did not 
end the discord. In February, 1918, the Prime Minister took the final 
step in a long series of realignments. He gave the program Cabinet 
status by creating a Ministry of Information; to this post he appointed 
Lord Beaverbrook, who had been active in propaganda work throughout the 
war. Assisted by Lord Northcliffe, Beaverbrook assembled a propaganda 
machine which was almost corporatelike in structure and efficiency.
While the two publishers reaped much of the credit, another figure was 
almost solely responsible for British publicity in America. Kiis was
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Sir Gilbert Parker; lie and his staff mailed pamphlets, articles and 
other materials to Americans* Distinguished Englishmen wrote articles 
for American newspapers and went to the United States to espouse the 
British cause. To reach rural areas, Parker provided 3^0 small American 
newspapers with an English weekly which published reviews and comments 
on the war. There also were films, photographs, cartoons, drawings and' 
diagrams for American consumption* Films, Parker said, enabled Britain 
to reach the "man in the street." To make contact with American intel­
lectuals, scholars at Oxford University wrote the Oxford Pamphlets.
Often grounded in scholarship, these pamphlets nonetheless conveyed the 
tenor of England's appeal to America.
This plea portrayed Berlin autocracy as satanic, violating all moral 
standards. Conversely, Britain was projected as the defender of demo­
cracy. One of the principal tools in London's play on American emotions 
was atrocity propaganda. Reports of German savagery ranged from stories 
about brutality in Belgium to the sinking of the Lusitania and the 
execution of Edith Cavell. , These stories sought to ignite an America 
which, in the Anglo view, was already sympathetic toward England by 
ties of history and culture. The British words did not go unchallenged. 
Germany, too, sought American favor. Like London, Berlin faced severe 
problems in trying to set up a workable program. There was very little 
departmental cooperation, a difficulty which was compounded by jealousy 
and the militarists' lack of understanding about propaganda. Ambassador 
Bernstorff emerged as the main figure in Berlin's publicity campaign. 
Articulate and public-relations minded, he set up press offices in both
73
Hew York City and Washington where American journalists could interview 
him and get the German viewpoint.
In their attempts to influence Americans, the Germans tried to foster 
mistrust of England and France and sought to nourish a pacifist move­
ment.^ Berlin dwelled on the theme that it was the injured party;
surrounded hy powerful foes, Germany had been forced to go to war. She
was actually a peace-loving nation. This theme was marred in large 
measure by reports of sabotage in war plants and aboard munitions ships 
bound for Allied ports. Documents captured in both Britain and the 
United States gave an air of credibility to German intrigues. At post­
war hearings, the Germans said their propaganda in America failed
because of the image left by these conspiracies and the implications of 
brutality in such incidents as the sinking of the Lusitania. Americans 
did not accept Berlin’s publicity, the Germans concluded, because it 
was contrary to the realism of political and military actions.
Whatever the overtures of British and German propaganda, President 
Wilson admonished Americans to be neutral in fact as well as in name ♦
On a lesser scale, this course proved almost as difficult on the home 
front as abroad. There were substantial profits to be had in war goods 
production and munitions trade. The question was whether the nation 
could reap these economic gains and still be truly non-belligerent.
The State Department ruled that while the Federal Government could not 
engage in this traffic, there was nothing to bar private citizens from 
manufacturing and selling aims and munitions to the warring nations. 
Likewise, the Administration permitted private sources to grant war
’jk
credits to the belligerents* These two measures cleared the m y  for the 
nation to thrive on wartime trade. Not so easily resolved, however, was 
the rift between the pacifists and the preparationists. The prepara- 
tionists considered themselves victorious when Wilson signed a $600 
million naval construction bill.
Abroad, the nation’s neutrality was put to rigid tests by both 
England and Germany. Britain's enforcement of the blockade and policies 
regarding blacklisting and contraband provided continuing friction in 
Anglo-American relations. Washington, after concluding it was futile 
to press for British adherence to the Declaration of London as the yard­
stick for neutral trade rights, protested with regularity what were 
viewed as infringements on American commerce. Indeed, the denunciations . 
challenged the principles of London’s blockade and rules on contraband.
The protests represented an indictment of the entire British policy. 
American hostility reached a peak in the summer and fall of 1916 when 
Congress enacted legislation empowering Wilson to effect an arms embargo. 
This was the aftermath of the British blacklisting of eighty-five 
American firms which London suspected of having links or dealing with 
Germany.
Whatever the resentment against England, Wilson never used the 
economic weapons at his command. In part, this was attributable to the 
strain which Germany placed on Washington. The sinking of the Lusitania, 
the torpedoing of the Sussex, and reports of German intrigues and sabotage 
in the United States provided a sore point which brought an American 
threat to sever relations in the spring of 1916. Berlin responded by
75
ordering its submarine commanders not to fire on merchant ships without 
giving warning; additionally, provisions were to be made for the saving 
of human lives. By winning these concessions from the German Admiralty, 
Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg managed to avert a break with Washington.
And Wilson, in spite of the hostility toward Britain, was able to turn 
his attention to peacemaking in the winter of 1916. Preceding his 
proposal was a Berlin offer which, while acclaiming Germany*s strength 
and certainty of victory, announced a readiness to discuss peace.
There was no mention of terms. Wilson then asked the belligerents to 
get forth their conditions for ending the war. Neither Bethmann-Hollweg 
nor Zimmermann wanted to do this, believing it would be to Germany’s 
disadvantage. Additionally, Zimmermann mistrusted the American Presi­
dent and feared he might have a role in negotiations.
Against this background, the German response to Wilson was simply 
a reiteration of Berlin’s previous offer and a suggestion that belliger­
ents assemble on neutral ground to discuss the issues. This reply 
represented an important turning point in German-American relations; it 
made the Allies* task easier in rebuffing the overtures. More important, 
the reply hastened the deterioration of prospects for creating a peace 
alternative to U-boat warfare. Britain and France spurned Berlin’s bid 
for talks, largely on the premise that terms were not declared. Amid 
these setbacks, Kaiser Wilhelm elected to take the advice of his mili­
tarists who demanded renewal of total submarine offensives. Bethmann- 
Hollweg warned of the perils this course held in provoking America.
For Wilson, peace aspirations still lived. He went before the Senate on
T 6
January 22 to outline his peace aims, suggesting the family of nations 
adopt the Monroe Doctrine as a world-wide yardstick in keeping the 
peace. Unfortunately, time had run out on him. Britain intercepted 
the Zimmermann Note, which revealed plans to resume unrestricted sub­
marine warfare and proposed a Gerraan-Mexican alliance if the United 
States entered the war. Then, on January 31> Berlin notified Washing­
ton of the return to all-out U-boat attacks, including raids on neutral 
shipping. This brought an immediate break in relations, Just as 
Washington had warned in the spring of 1916. After first resorting to 
the arming of American merchantmen, Wilson sent before Congress on 
April 2 to ask for a declaration of war against Germany. In his 
request, he cited the continuing loss of American lives and ships to 
U-boats, the Zimmermann Note and German sabotage. Submarine warfare 
against commerce, he asserted, was ”• . • warfare against mankind.”
This was the background against which America took up arms.
Some students of neutrality concluded in post-war studies that it was 
British propaganda which drove the United States into the war. In the 
view of these scholars, London publicity played upon American sentiment 
and made a mockery of Wilsonian neutrality. They accused House,
Lansing —  and even the President —  of strong pro-Ally feelings despite 
the nation*s hands-off diplomacy* These students contended that the 
nation, greedy for war profits and eager for an Anglo victory, actually 
practiced a double standard of neutrality. The United States, they 
charged, closed its eyes to English violations of international law*
For Germany, on the other hand, there was an on-guard stance and the
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speedy dispatch of ultimatums at the slightest provocation. This pro- 
Ally attitude prevented finding solutions to issues which might have 
been resolved in 1915 and 1916. Finally, in the spring of 1917 >
America had played out its hand; there was no alternative to war. In 
all of this —  according to such scholars of neutrality as Peterson, 
Barnes, Millis, Borchard, and Squires —  the role of British propaganda 
was overpowering.
The validity of these charges must be weighed against the course 
of events in America's relations with both England and Germany. What­
ever the impact of London’s publicity, the controversies involving 
Britain’s blockade, blacklisting and contraband cannot be ignored. They 
were serious enough that both Congress and Wilson favored economic 
measures which, if executed, could have seriously hampered the Allied 
war effort. While the Administration did not utilise the available 
powers of economic boycott, Washington was sufficiently provoked in the 
summer and fall of 1916 to have these weapons ready. The issues behind 
this move were substantive in nature. Regardless of the British sympa­
thies which the highest leaders in the Administration may have held, 
they did lodge severe protests with London. Whether Parker's publicity 
helped soften the stands which might have been taken -- including an 
embargo —  cannot be determined. It can be said, however, that munitions 
trade and granting of war credits served the nation*s economic interests. 
Instituting a boycott would have ended the war profits. These factors 
must be weighed in assessing American policy toward Britain. Perhaps
T8
it amounted to greed; by any definition, the trade was legitimate.
Even the Germans did not question it until after the Battle of the Marne.
On the other side of the coin, the confrontations between the 
United States and Germany ran a two-year course and more before war 
was declared. In the interim between the sinking of the Lusitania 
and the decision to take up arms, there were serious provocations —  
losses of American ships and lives to German torpedoes. In these 
situations Wilson largely kept his own counsel; he did not yield to the 
severe demands made by Lansing and House. Indeed, the statement that 
the President was both firm and patient with Germany seems to be a 
fair assessment. The figure of Wilson looms large, overshadowing those 
of his key advisers, in analyzing German-American relations. He rejected 
the go-softly policy which Bryan advocated in dealing with Berlin; by 
the same token, the President ruled out the harsh measures favored by 
Lansing and House. American neutrality and a desire for peace surely 
were Wilson*s two principal motivations. He still was actively bidding 
for peace in January, 1917* His was not a war policy; he bowed to war 
only when the nation*s interests were directly at stake and it became 
clear that Germany meant what she said about total U-boat warfare.
The loss of American ships and lives proved it. Washington severed 
relations with Berlin on February 3 5 two more months elapsed before the 
decision was made to take up aims. With these grave issues widening 
the gulf between Washington and Berlin, it is questionable whether 
British propaganda somehow drove the nation to war. Perhaps it is more 
likely that Kaiser Wilhelm flung the door wide open to American entry
79
into the conflict when he accepted the advice of his militarists over 
that of Bethmann-Hollweg. Of course, it can never he known what would 
have been the case, as far as American neutrality and ultimate entrance 
into the war is concerned, had British propaganda not been present.
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